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I. STATEMENT OF CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS

A.

Statement of the Case
The action underlying this appeal is a suit for legal malpractice.

Attorneys at the

Respondent law firm, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley (HTEH), represented and advised
Appellant Walter Minnick in the preparation, revision, execution and recording of a conservation
easement. The Conservation Easement Agreement conveyed a charitable gift to a not-for-profit
land trust with considerable potential tax benefits to Mr. Minnick and his wife, the Appellants
herein. The Agreement, as revised and approved by Respondents, contained express language
warranting that "there are no outstanding mortgages . ..

that have not been expressly

subordinated to the Easement." Despite this warranty, HTEH negligently failed to assure that
such a subordination occurred prior to recording the easement l .

Because of this failure to

subordinate, and for this sole reason, the United States Tax Court (Tax Court) disallowed the
Appellants any charitable deduction on their income tax returns, resulting in taxes, interest and
penalties of several hundred thousand dollars.
This appeal arises from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the
Respondents on statute of limitation grounds, pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 5-219(4). The
trial court found that the malpractice action accrued more than two years before suit was filed,
when Appellants first retained a tax attorney to represent them on an audit before the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). It reached this result despite clear, undisputed evidence that failure to
subordinate (the basis of the malpractice claim) was never raised as a concern by the IRS and
was not adopted by the Tax Court as the singular, dispositive reason for denying the charitable
deduction until within the two year limitation period for filing the malpractice suit.
I When the problem with the subordination surfaced four years later, the Respondent law firm did assist Appellants
in obtaining and recording a subordination. But, as we discuss below, it was too late for Appellants to obtain a
charitable tax deduction.

At the time suit was filed and, indeed, at the time the District Court granted summary
judgment, the Appellants were in the process of appealing the Tax Court decision.

No tax

liability had yet been assessed by the IRS for the Appellants' claimed tax deduction.
Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that Appellants sustained "some damage" triggering the
running of the statute of limitation when they first retained a tax attorney to represent them
before the IRS on issues unrelated to subordination which did not implicate malpractice. Failure
to subordinate was not raised as a potential concern by the IRS until almost a year later, and was
not added by the IRS as a reason for disallowing the charitable deduction until five months
before Appellants filed suit.
The District Court disregarded the unequivocal fact that Appellants sustained no
objectively ascetiainable damage (e.g. attorney fees) relating to the act or omission which forms
the basis of the malpractice suit (e.g. failure to subordinate), until within two years of Appellants
filing their malpractice suit. In the language of the precedent decisions of this Court, until there
was objectively ascertainable, actual damages, which resulted from the Respondents'
malpractice, and that could be recovered in a malpractice action, any suit Appellants might have
filed earlier would have lacked proof of some damages and would have been subject to
dismissal.
Having granted summary judgment to the Respondents, the District Court then awarded
them costs of $66.00 and attorney's fees of $50,000.00. Appellants argued below, and argue
again on this appeal, that there was no "commercial transaction" within the meaning of Idaho
Code, Section 12-120(3) warranting an attorney fee award. No "transaction" is identified as
integral to Appellants' legal malpractice claim, and to the extent the Conservation Easement
might be considered a "transaction," it was a "personal" gift, not "commercial." Nonetheless,
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the District Court modified the proper legal standard and found that HTEH was hired "for a
commercial purpose."

Because Appellants were looking to eventually develop and sell the

property affected by the Conservation Easement, the District Court held, the legal representation
was "commercial in nature."
Both the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney fees are assigned as error
and are the subjects of this appeal.

B.

The Proceedings Below
The Appellants tiled the instant action as a single cause of action for professional

malpractice on June 7, 2012. (R. pp. 6-18) Respondents answered the Complaint on January 14,
2013, raising eight affirmative defenses, including statute oflimitations. (R. pp. 19-27) The only
discovery engaged in between the parties was the voluntary exchange of extensive documents
and one set of written discovery requests from the Appellants. (R. pp. 509-517) No depositions
were taken by either party.
On August 16, 2013, Appellants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking
dismissal of four of Respondents' defenses for estoppel, assumption of risk, statute of limitations
and a contention the Tax Court would have denied the charitable deduction for other reasons, if
not for lack of subordination. (R. pp. 266-67; 274-308) Respondents also filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment based on the two year limitation ofIdaho Code, Section 5-219(4). (R. pp.
28-29)
Following the submission of briefs and supporting affidavits and documents, the District
Court scheduled the cross-motions for hearing. (R. pp. 45-46) Appellants' submissions included
an affidavit from their tax attorney, Tim Tarter, amplified by numerous documents explaining
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the related IRS and Tax Court proceedings. (R. pp. 337-505) These show, among other things,
that no question or concern whatsoever was raised by the IRS about mortgage subordination as a
possible reason to disqualify the Appellants' claimed tax deduction until June 10, 2010, at the
earliest2.
The law firm's submissions included affidavits from the two attorneys primarily involved
in Appellants' representation, Brian Ballard and Geoffrey Wardle. While the affidavits were
submitted on summary judgment issues other than the statute of limitations question, the District
Court nonetheless relied upon them in granting summary judgment and to an extent in awarding
attorney fees.
Hearing was held on summary judgment on October 2,2013. (R. pp. 45-46) On October
28, 2013 the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, effectively dismissing the entire suit as barred by the statute of
limitations. (R. pp. 719-729) It did not decide the Appellants' summary judgment motion as it
related to other affirmative defenses. (R. p. 728)
Respondents' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs was filed November 12,
2013. (R. pp. 730-731) Appellants responded with their objections on November 25,2013, to
which Respondents replied on December 6, 2013.

(R. pp. 747-749) Following hearing on

December 30, 2013, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision awarding the
Respondents costs of $66.00 and fees of $50,000.

(R. pp. 780-790) Appellants' Notice of

Appeal on the summary judgment decision was filed December 5, 2013 (R. pp. 764-77),

2 This is the date the IRS first sent a facsimile asking for "a copy of any and all subordination agreements." (R. pp.
386) However, as is discussed below, failure to subordinate was not identified by the IRS as a reason to deny the
charitable deduction until October 4, 2011 (R. pp. 416-421), and not pled as a ground for disallowance until January
5,2012. (R. pp. 435-36)
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followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal to incorporate the fees award on January 22, 2014.
(R. pp. 793-96)

C.

Statement of Facts
Inasmuch as this appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment, the pertinent facts

are contained in the Complaint, corroborated and amplified by affidavits and further supported
by numerous documents referenced in the affidavits. Accompanying this Brief is a Chronology
of Events documented with references to the record which may be of assistance to this Court in
understanding the protracted and somewhat complicated contextual history of the case.
Before the District Court, the parties' briefings disagreed on several factual contentions,
many of which are immaterial for the purpose of this appeal. (See R. pp. 660-663; 675-681)
But, most notable and most material here is the scope of Respondents' legal representation. The
District Court's summary of facts in its decision granting summary judgment is fairly accurate
(R. pp. 719-722) although, as we discuss below, omits several facts important to the issues raised
on appeal, most significantly found in the affidavits of Appellate Walter Minnick and
Appellants' tax attorney Tim Tarter (Tarter).
In the spring of 2004, Appellant Walter Minnick ("Minnick") had discussions with a
neighbor who was interested in purchasing a significant portion of land Minnick owned in rural
Ada County. (R. pp. 688; 693) Initially, Minnick engaged the services of Brian Ballard at the
Respondent law firm on the purchase and sale agreement. (R. p. 654,

~

4) However, in the

course of ensuing discussions, in roughly June 2004, Minnick decided that rather than sell the
land, he would develop it himself in what eventually became known as the Showy Phlox Estates
(herein "Showy Phlox"). (ld.)
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At the time, Minnick was aware the land he owned, as well as surrounding property,
contained critical wildlife and plant habitat, wetland, watershed, riparian, natural scenery and
other conservation values.

(R. pp. 688; 693) Sometime in the fall or early winter of 2004,

Minnick had informal conversations with the Open Space and Trail Coordinator with Ada
County and people with the Land Trust for Treasure Valley ("Land Trust") about a conservation
easement affecting his property to be granted to the Land Trust. (Id.; R. pp. 317-318, ~~ 9-10)
The property comprising the Showy Phlox development was 73.81 acres in size, located
off North Cartwright Road with frontage on Dry Creek, about one mile east of the Hidden
Springs Subdivision. (R. pp. 8-9,

~

16) Minnick's plan was to divide the property into seven

single family residential housing lots, approximately ten acres each. (Id.

~

15) A significant

component of the project was a conservation easement restricting use and development on
effectively 80% of the land. (Id.

~

17; R. p. 524; Exh. X at 4, item 1) This easement was

eventually donated to the Land Trust, a not-for-profit organization committed to conserving open
space, habitat recreation and scenic values close to residential communities, and a qualified
organization to receive charitable contributions satisfying Section 170(b)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. (R. p. 316, ~ 3)
When Minnick decided to pursue the Showy Phlox development, Ballard's involvement
diminished and another attorney at HTEH, Geoff Wardle, took over and assumed responsibility
for Appellants' legal needs, as they related to the Showy Phlox matter. (R. p. 654,

~

4) The law

firm and the client never entered into a written retainer agreement and there was no engagement
letter describing or limiting the scope of legal services contemplated or intended by the parties.
(R. p. 10,

~

21-23; 499-500,

~~

7 & 8)
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In the underlying litigation, and in their submissions to the trial court on the cross
motions for summary judgment, the parties disagreed considerably on the scope of the law firm's
services, particularly as they pertain to the conservation easement. For example, Appellants
contend that HTEH was aware from the inception of the firm's engagement that a significant
feature of the proposed project would be a conservation easement granted to the Land Trust as a
charitable gift. (R. pp. 9, , 17 & 19; 499, , 5) Respondent Wardle denies he was told by
Minnick that he planned to claim the Conservation Easement as a tax deduction and never
conceived of it as a gift. (R. pp. 650-51, , 6) From his perspective, Wardle merely reviewed the
conservation easement to ensure it met local land use requirements. (Id.' 5)
Nonetheless, on certain facts regarding the conservation easement there should be no
dispute. 3 At the request of Wardle, Minnick obtained a model conservation easement agreement
from the Land Trust and gave it to Wardle. (R. pp. 10-11,,25; 500, , 10) The billing records of
HTEH show Wardle was involved in reviewing, amending and revising numerous drafts of what
evolved as the final Conservation Easement Agreement between February and September 2006.
(R. pp. 580-583; HTEH 5644-5647) The Land Trust's attorney and Wardle prepared and

reviewed as many as five drafts of the Agreement. (R. p. 500, , 12) All of the drafts, as well as
the final version (R. pp. 534-542; Exh. Y at 7, , 11) prepared and recorded by Respondents,
provided the following warranty:
Grantor warrants that it owns the Property in fee simple and has
conveyed it to no other person, and that there are no outstanding
mortgages, tax liens, encumbrances, or other interests in the
Property that have not been expressly subordinated to the
Easement. Grantor further warrants that Grantee shall have the use
of and enjoy all the benefits derived from and arising out of this
Easement. (Emphasis added)

To the extent these matters may be disputed in Respondents' Brief, they certainly may be assumed as true for the
purpose of summary judgment.

3
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The Internal Revenue Code authorizing tax deduction for "qualified conservation contributions"
(generally, 26 CFR Section 1.170A-14), also required subordination, stating in Section 1.170A14(g)(2):
No deduction will be permitted under this section for an interest in
property which is subject to a mortgage unless the mortgage
subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified
organization to enforce the conservation purpose of the gift in
perpetui ty.

At the time of the law firm's services, U.S. Bank had a mortgage on the Showy Phlox
property. (R. pp. 544-551, Exhibit Z) Nonetheless, the Respondents never advised or discussed
with Appellants the need to subordinate the mortgage to the Conservation Easement. (R. pp. 16,
~

57; 501,

~

14) On September 7, 2006, Minnick was presented with a large number of

agreements and instruments relating to the Showy Phlox project requiring his signature,
including the finalized Conservation Easement Agreement. (Id.,

~

15) That same day the fully

executed Conservation Easement was recorded by HTEH with Ada County as Instrument No.
10614469. (R. pp. 534-543, Exhibit Y) By this transaction, the Easement was conveyed to the
Land Trust as a charitable gift, exclusively for the conservation purposes as a perpetual
limitation on the use and enjoyment of the property within the Showy Phlox Estates. (Id; R. pp.
11-12,

~

30) At the time the Conservation Easement was granted to the Land Trust, no

instrument was prepared by the law firm or recorded subordinating the bank mortgage. (R. p. 12,
~

32; 501, ~~ 16 - 17)
The Minnicks filed a joint tax return in 2006, claiming the conservation easement grant to

the Land Trust as a charitable deduction, and then carried part of the deduction forward on their
2007 and 2008 federal tax returns. In 2009, the IRS notified the Minnicks their 2006 return was
selected for examination, indicating only that the audit would primarily focus on "Schedule A
8

Contributions

Conservation Easement". (R. pp. 338, ~ 5; 344-346, Exh. E)4 Mr. Minnick and

his accountant met with the IRS Examiner whose only issue of concern was the valuation of the
easement, but were unable to resolve the matter. (ld.

~

6) So, on June 1, 2009 Appellants

engaged Tarter, an attorney with tax specialty, to represent them on "questions then being raised
by the IRS" relating to the charitable donation for the Conservation Easement. (!d.

~

4)

Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 2009, the IRS issued notices of disallowance, commonly
referred to as "30-day letters". (ld.

~

7) Accompanying these letters was an Examiner's Report

explaining the reason for recommending disallowance. (Id.

~

8) The four reasons identified at

that time are discussed and explained in detail herein below. But, sufficc it to say, they did not
include failure to subordinate the U.S. Bank mortgagc and did not implicate a potential claim of
malpractice against Respondents.
On December 14, 2009, the Minnicks' tax counsel filed a Petition to the Tax Court
challenging the disallowance notices and the reasons stated therein. (R. pp. 339,

~

12; 379-381,

Exh. I) Again, neither the Petition nor the Answer filed by the IRS involved subordination or any
other issue which might implicate malpractice on the part of HTEH. (R. pp. 382-384)
Not until June 10, 2010, did the IRS raise any question about whether there was a
subordination agreement.

(R. pp. 340, ~ 14-15; 385-386, Exh. K)5

Sometime thereafter,

Appellants tax counsel learned from Wardle that no subordination agreement had been prepared
or recorded by HTEH. (Id.

~

16) With Wardle's assistance, a subordination agreement was

finally prepared and signed by the bank, and on September 12, 2011, that agreement was
recorded by HTEH. (Id.

~

17)

The only documents requested for the audit were the Purchase Contract and Appraisal Report. (R. p. 346)
The IRS Appeals Officer wrote Tarter asking for a number of documents including "a copy of any and all
subordination agreements." (R. p. 386, item 8)
4

5
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On September 13, 2011, the IRS filed its Pre-Trial Memorandum with the Tax Court
claiming for the first time that the subordination requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2)
had not been met. (Id.,-r 19) When trial began in the Tax Court on October 4, 2011, the IRS filed
for leave to amend its answer to allow subordination as a new ground for disallowance. 6 (Id.,-r
20; 416-422, Exh. M) The Tax COUli granted the amendment after the trial on January 5, 2012,
and set a briefing schedule for post-trial briefs on all issues. (R. p. 341, ,-r,-r 22-23; 435-436 Exh.
0)

However, on April 3, 2012, a decision was issued in another related Tax Court case,
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 16 (2012). (Id.,-r 23; R. pp. 437-463 Exh. P) Until that
decision, there was uncertainty about whether a defect on filing a subordination agreement could
be corrected by recording the subordination after the claimed deduction, precisely what had
happened in the Minnicks' situation. Mitchell ruled the subordination had to be filed before
granting the conservation easement. (R. pp. 439-441 and 460, Exh. Pat 13-15 and 24)
Anticipating that they might lose the Tax Court case because of the Mitchell decision, on
June 7, 2012, Appellants filed their malpractice suit against Respondents. (R. p. 6) This was
within two years of when the IRS first raised any question about a subordination agreement, and
within five months of when the issue was added as a ground for disallowance in the Tax Court.
(R. pp. 435-36, Exh. 0) Appellants withheld service of the Complaint, however, until December,
2012, hoping that they might convince the Tax Court that their situation was distinguishable
from Mitchell. 7
Because of the Mitchell decision, the Tax Court issued a new scheduling order on July
18, 2012, limiting post-trial arguments only to whether Appellants had satisfied the

6
7

Tarter objected to the amendment as untimely. (R. pp. 340, ~ 21; 423-431; Exh. N)
Service was accepted by Respondents' counsel on December 5, 2012.
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subordination requirements of the regulations and whether they would be subject to penalties for
failing to meet such requirements. (R. p. 341,

~

24; 465, Exh. R) With this order, the controlling

issue before the Tax Court became timely subordination. (Id.

~

25) On December 17, 2012, the

Tax Court issued its decision holding that "[b]ecause the U.S. Bank's mortgage was not
subordinated to the conservation easement when it was granted, no deduction is permitted for the
grant of the conservation easement". (R. pp. 341-42, ~ 26; 471 Exh. Sat 6) Given this ruling, the
Tax Court stated that it "need not reach the IRS's alternative arguments for denying the
deduction." (R. p. 476, Exh. S at 11)
On January 22, 2013, the Minnicks filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Tax
Court which was denied June 30, 2013. (R. pp. 342,

~

27,487-505 Exhs. T & U) As of the time

the Respondents and Appellants sought summary judgment in the malpractice suit, the Minnicks
had until September 18,2013 to appeal the Tax Court decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. (Jd.

~

29) By the time of oral argument, the District Court was advised that

appeal had been timely filed. (Tr. P. 23, Lines 6-12) The trial court was also advised that the
IRS had yet to issue any tax assessment to Appellants and, pursuant to 26 U.S.C., Section 6203,
it was Tim Tarter's understanding no assessment would be issued until the adverse decision of
the Tax Court becomes final 8 . (R. p. 342, ~ 28)

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The following issues are presented by their appeal.
A. Whether Plaintiffs' legal malpractice suit accrued within two years of when it was
filed on June 7, 2012, or is barred by I.C. § 5-219(4).
828 U.S.C. § 6203 provides that no assessment will issue until the Tax Court decision becomes final. See f. n. 9,
infra.

11

B. Whether any party in this action is entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.e. §

12-120(3), at the District Court or on appeal.

III. ARGUMENT

A.

Appellants' Malpractice Suit is Not Barred by Idaho Code, Section 5-219(4).
Idaho Code, Section 5-219(4) declares that an action for professional malpractice accrues

"as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of."

From the foregoing

discussion of the facts and the attached chronology, it is evident that the Respondents' negligent
acts and omissions alleged by the Appellants occurred in 2006; most certainly when the
Conservation Easement was reviewed, modified and finalized by Geoff Wardle, then executed
by Walt Minnick and recorded by HTEH on September 7, 2006, without any subordination
agreement. However, for almost three decades, it has been clear that the limitation of Section 5219(4) is not measured simply by when the negligent conduct occurred. Accrual also requires
the existence of some actual damage, and that damage must be something that could be
recovered in the malpractice action. Stated more succinctly, the action does not accrue until
there is some damage that was proximately caused by the actionable malpractice. It is on this
precise standard that the District Court erred.
1.

Applicable Legal Standards
This Court has repeatedly held that before the action accrues and the two-year limitation

period begins to run, tangible evidence of "some damage" to the plaintiff is required. A cause of
action "cannot accrue until some damage has occurred." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho
656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009). See also Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d
960,963 (1994); Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). The reason
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for this rule is that "in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove
actual damage." Stephens, supra.
Until some damage occurs, a cause of action for professional
malpractice does not accrue. Therefore, some damage is required
because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is
barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even
accrues.
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002) (Citations omitted).

Further, it must be "objectively ascertainable damage." Id.
[A]n action for professional malpractice shall be deemed to have
accrued for the purposes of I.C. § 5-219(4) only when there is
objective proof that would support the existence of some actual
damage.
Chicoine v. Bignal!, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). Simply being at increased

risk for potential loss or damage is not sufficient. "This Court differentiates between actual
damage and the potential for damage." Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, 154 Idaho
21,25,293 P.3d 645 (2013) See also, Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 Idaho 480, 483,
95 P.3d 631,633 (2004)
And, most importantly for the purpose of the instant action, the damage that triggers the
running of the statute "must be damage that the client could recover from the professional in an
action for malpractice." Buxton, supra, 146 Idaho at 659. It must be damage that resulted from
the wrongful act or omission that forms the basis of the malpractice action. "For the cause of
action to have accrued, the damage must have resulted from the act of malpractice ('the
occurrence, act or omission complained of)." Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 147, 106 P.3d
470,473 (2005). Id. Stated perhaps more directly, the statute of limitations does not begin until
there is an act or omission of malpractice and actual damage proximately caused by that
malpractice. The action does not accrue until the plaintifI "has a complete and present cause of
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action, i.e. when he can file suit and obtain relief." McCabe v. Cravens, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188
P.3d 896 (2008) (applying federal law).
2.

Application of Legal Principles in Tax Cases.

There are two Idaho decisions involving income tax related claims of professional
malpractice of seemingly analogous import which were debated below and noted in the District
Court's decision: Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985) and Elliott v. Parsons. 128
Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592 (1996).

However, before discussing each case, we should be mindful

of this Court's admonition in Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876,880 (1991):
The determination of what constitutes 'damage' for the purpose of
accrual of an action must be decided on the circumstances of each
case.
Streib and Elliott are only instructive insofar as they provide insight in determining when there is

objectively ascertainable evidence the Appellants sustained actual damage proximately caused
by the particular occurrence, act or omission of malpractice complained of: so as to be
actionable.
In the first of these cases, Streib, an accountant was charged with preparing flawed tax
returns over the course of five years. The errors were discovered roughly two years after the last
tax return and the accountant was sued for malpractice less than a year later. 109 Idaho at 174.
The district court granted summary judgment to the accountant finding that the plaintiffs were
damaged and the action accrued when the tax returns were filed because as of that date "the
plaintiffs were obligated to pay the full taxes due." !d. at 175. However, reversing the trial
court, this Court held that "no damage was suffered until the tax return was challenged and an
assessment made by the Internal Revenue Service." Id at 178
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While this may appear to set a bright line for the accrual of malpractice claims arising
from erroneous tax returns, Streib did not elaborate on what this Court meant by an
"assessment." The accountant in that case conceded the action was timely "if measured trom the
time of assessment of interest and penalties." Id. at 174-75. Accordingly, the Streib Court never
identified a date or defining event.
More than a decade later, in another tax case, Elliott, this Court made note of this
ambiguity from the Streib decision and clarified its intentions. 128 Idaho at 725. Elliott was a
legal malpractice action alleging that the defendant-attorney was supposed to structure the sale of
a family-owned farm equipment dealership so as to allow the seller to defer its tax liability until
it actually received the installment purchase payments. 128 Idaho at 724. Years after the Elliotts
filed their tax return, the IRS conducted an audit and concluded the transaction did not qualify.
Id.

The IRS then issued what is referred to as a "30-day letter" contending the Elliotts owed

additional taxes and interest. Following an administrative process that did not resolve the matter,
the IRS issued a notice of deficiency, or "90-day letter," which the Elliotts contested by
instituting proceedings in the U.S. Tax Court. Id. Ultimately, before trial, the Elliotts settled
with the IRS and, based on the settlement the IRS issued an assessment for a reduced tax
liability. Id. Approximately five months later the attorney and his firm were sued, alleging they
negligently structured the sales transaction. Id.
The trial court dismissed the suit on statute of limitation grounds, concluding that the
Elliotts suffered "some damage" when they received the 30-day letter. Id. at 725. But Justice
Johnson, writing for the Supreme Court disagreed, explaining what was intended by the term
"assessment," as used in Streib.
[I]t is clear that it meant the point at which I.R.S. assesses an
enforceable and collectible tax liability against the taxpayer, not
15

the mere initiation of the I.R.S. challenge as evidenced by the 30day and 90-day letters. The issuance of an assessment under
I.R.C. § 6203 may corne soon after I.R.S. challenges a tax
return as in Streib, or it may come at the conclusion of a
lengthy administrative and legal process as in the present case.
Until there has been an assessment of unpaid taxes against the
taxpayer, I.R.S. has not inflicted 'some damage' against the
taxpayer - at least not as the term was used by this court in Streib.
(Emphasis added) 9
Despite this clarification, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on statute of limitation grounds, but on a different rational than the date of assessment.
Instead, the Court focused upon when the Elliotts first incurred legal expenses, explaining:
Streib does not resolve the present case, however, because
the Elliotts suffered "some damage" before the issuance of the
I.R.S. assessment when they retained new tax counsel to resolve
their disputes with I.R.S. in February 1986.

***

[T]he Elliotts sustained "some damage" in the form of
attorney fees - a monetary loss they would not have suffered but
for Parsons's alleged malpractice - when they hired new tax
lawyers in 1986 after receiving the 30 day letter from I.R.S.
Therefore, we uphold the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of Parsons, although based on a different rationale of when the
Elliotts sustained "some damage" to commence the running of the
two year statute of limitations contained in I.C. § 5-219(4).

128 Idaho at 725. Without question, the instant action similar to Elliott in several respects. The
Appellants were issued a 30-day letter and following an administrative review, they were issued
a 90-day letter.

Before they were issued an assessment, they retained tax counsel who

challenged the IRS notice of deficiency by initiating an action before the U.S. Tax Court.
9 Section 6203 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 6203) merely describes that an assessment is made by
"recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary (of Treasury) in accordance with the rules or
regulations prescribed by the Secretary." Typically, the taxpayer is advised through issuance of a Form 4340
Certificate of Assessments and Payments, which is prescriptive notice of a liability. Farr v. u.s., 926 F.Supp. 147,
151-52 (D. Idaho 1996) However, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6213, "no assessment ofa deficiency in respect to any
tax imposed ... and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun or prosecuted ... if a petition
has been filed in the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final." And, 26 u.s.c. § 7481
makes clear that no decision of the Tax Court shall become tinal until expiration of the time allowed for appeal, or,
if appealed, when the decision is affirmed or the appeal dismissed.
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However, as we discuss in greater detail below, the differences of the instant action are
considerable and, we submit, dictate an opposite result here.

3.

Elliott v. Parsons is Not Controlling Here
On cursory review, it may appear that Elliott

IS

controlling in the instant action.

Certainly, the trial court was of that impression, concluding that the action accrued "as soon as
the Plaintiffs retained subsequent counsel to address any problem with the easement or charitable
deduction." (Emphasis added) (R. p. 725) But upon closer review this conclusion is an incorrect
interpretation of Elliott and deviates materially from the "some damage" principle expressed in
cases preceding and following Elliott.
To begin with, there is a major factual distinction between Elliott and this action. In
Elliott, tax counsel was retained "to resist Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claims stemming from

their former lawyer's allegedly negligent structuring and draft of a transaction for the sale of
their business." 128 Idaho at 724. This nexus between incurring legal fees for a purpose directly
connected with the alleged malpractice was pivotal to the analysis and outcome in Elliott. See,
128 Idaho at 725 ("the expenditure of legal fees to defend against an action filed because of an
attorney's alleged malpractice constituted 'some damage"').
In contrast, the Appellants retained tax counsel initially to address a number of issues the
IRS raised as reasons for disqualifying a charitable deduction, none of which implicated a
potential claim of malpractice against Respondents. The reasons for disallowance articulated by
the IRS which caused Appellants to retain tax counsel were very particular. In its 30-day letter
on June 30, 2009, the IRS alleged that the charitable deduction failed (1) because it was a quid
pro quo transaction with the Land Trust, (2) because it was not "exclusively for conservation
purposes," (3) because there needed to be a written acknowledgment from the Land Trust that no
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goods or services were provided in consideration for the gift,IO and (4) because the IRS contested
the value of the donation ("the appraisal of the property used [a] Hawed valuation analysis"). (R.
pp. 365-369; Exh. G.1 pp. 1.5

1.9) (See also R. pp. 338-339, ~~ 8 & 10)

All of these allegations involved issues unrelated to Respondents' legal services. None
gave rise to a claim of malpractice against Respondents. And, none were ever alleged as the
basis of Appellants' suit.
Not until almost a year later, on June 10, 2010, did the IRS make any inquiry about
subordination. (R. p. 340,

~~

14-15) In a facsimile to Appellants' tax attorney the IRS Appeals

Officer inquired: "If the Property was encumbered as of the date of the donation, please provide
a copy of any and all subordination agreements (including mortgages)." (Id., p. 385-86 Exh K
item 8) Not until another sixteen months later, October 4, 2011, did the IRS seek to amend its
Tax Court pleadings to add failure to subordinate as an alleged ground for denying the deduction.
(R. pp. 340-41,

~~
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21,416-431, Exh. M and N) And this amendment was not granted until

January 5, 2012, after the Tax Court trial. (R. p. 341,

~

22, 435-36, Exh. 0) The filing of

Appellants' Complaint on June 7, 2012 was within two years of all of these dates; less than two
years after subordination became an articulated reason for disallowing the charitable deduction
and an acute malpractice concern.
If the expense of attorney fees to challenge IRS claims can trigger the running of the
statute of limitations, as Elliott instructs, it can only do so if the expense is causally connected to
an identifiable act or omission of malpractice. Incurring legal fees on unrelated tax issues would
not be damages that "resulted from the act of malpractice." Conway, 141 Idaho at 147. Such
fees would not be "damages the client could recover from the professional in an action for
malpractice." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 659. Without "a complete and present cause of action," i.e.,
10

This acknowledgment existed and was subsequently provided to the IRS. (R. p. 339, ~~ 10-11)
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a negligent act or omission and actual damage proximately caused by such negligence, McCabe,
145 Idaho at 957, no action would accrue and the statute of limitations could not commence
runmng.
4.

The District Court Misconstrued the Facts to Reach an Erroneous Result.
The analysis of the trial court in granting summary judgment is simply stated in its

decision. Because no express limitation was placed on the "scope of legal services offered,
recommended or provided by the (law) firm," the District Court infers Appellants "expected the
Defendants to structure the transaction so as to allow them to claim the easement as a charitable
deduction," and then finds that the Respondents' "representation included any and all issues
related to the recording of the easement and related charitable deduction." (R. p. 725) On this
analysis the District Court reached the following conclusion
Since (for the purpose of this motion) the scope of representation
encompassed all tasks related to the charitable deduction, the
statute of limitations began as soon as Plaintiffs retained new
counsel to help them resolve the charitable deduction dispute with
the IRS.
(R. p. 726) While inventive, this reasoning defies logic and altogether dismisses conflicting

evidence.
The absence of express limitations is not conclusive proof that the scope of representation
had no limitations dictated by the circumstances and reasonably understood by the parties.
Appellants have never alleged nor reasonably implied that "the scope of representation
encompassed all tasks related to the charitable deduction," without limitation. Moreover, the
interpretation of "all tasks" to include the four specific reasons given for disallowance by the IRS
in July 2009, which precipitated the hiring of tax counsel, is simply wrong.

19

Appellants have not claimed that HTEH was responsible for the IRS's characterization of
the conservation easement as a quid pro quo transaction. And, the record clearly contradicts any
misapprehension the trial court may have had that this issue was one of the "tasks" included in
the scope of Respondents' representation. Of particular note, Respondents embraced the IRS's
unadjudicated quid pro quo contention as an affirmative defense in response to the Appellants
malpractice suit CR. p. 26, 8th Aff Def.). Appellants sought summary judgment on this purported
defense. CR. pp. 298-307; 681-682) Although the trial court never ruled on that motion because
it found the entire action untimely CR. p. 728), there is extensive briefing in the record
demonstrating rather conclusively there was no quid pro quo consideration for the easement from
the Land Trust. Nowhere in that briefing is it suggested the quid pro quo issue arose from
Respondents' malpractice.
The IRS contention that the appraisal of the property used a t1awed valuation analysis
was also embraced as one of Respondents' affirmative defenses, contending this unadjudicated
claim barred Respondents from any liability for damages. This defense was also the subject of
Appellants' partial summary judgment motion. CR. pp. 298-307; 681-82) Any concern the IRS
had on valuation did not give rise to a malpractice claim against Respondents and Appellants
have never made such a claim. Indeed, as the trial court could have easily discerned below, the
appraisal at issue in the tax court was handled completely by Appellants and an independent
appraiser well after HTEH ceased providing legal services to Appellants.
On the other two disallowance reasons initially given by the IRS, it is beyond
comprehension how the trial court could believe these implicated Respondents' legal services.
The IRS Examiner's contention that the easement was not "exclusively for conservation
purposes" has to do with an interpretation of whether it preserves land in perpetuity for public
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recreation, education, or scenIC enjoyment, protects fish, wildlife or plant habitat or is
historically important. (R. pp. 355-57, Exh. G.l at 1-6 and 1.7) It has never been suggested that
HTEH could alter the character of the affected real property to have avoided this debate with the
IRS. And, the IRS contention that there was no contemporaneous written document from the
Land Trust acknowledging that it gave no goods or services in consideration for the charitable
gift, proved to be factually in error. (R. p. 358, at 1.8) This written acknowledgment existed, was
subsequently provided to the IRS, and the IRS abandoned this as a reasons for disallowing the
charitable deduction. (R. p. 339, ~ 11)
The trial court knew and even acknowledged that "[t]he Affidavits of Geoffrey Wardle
and Walter C. Minnick are in stark contrast regarding the scope of Defendants' representation."
(R. p. 725) Nonetheless, it dismissed the idea that this created a material factual dispute through
a rather interesting, but nonetheless disingenuous device. Observing that "the court must resolve
this factual dispute in Plaintiffs favor" (R. p. 726), the District Court ignored the Respondents'
conflicting evidence and proceeded to interpret the factual record decisively unfavorable to the
Appellants.
Selectively, the trial court quotes in part from answers to interrogatories adopted by Mr.
Minnick (Jd., citing Exh. CC at 12-13) (See also, R. pp. 687-88; 696-97) and portions of the
Complaint, representing that there were no express limitations on the scope of representation and
HTEH never advised Appellants to seek advice on tax matters from other attorneys or skilled
professionals outside the firm. Omitted from any mention by the District Court is the rest of the
Appellants' interrogatory response, including the following:
Minnick recalls having a distinct conversation with Defendant
Wardle about his intent to grant the conservation easement to the
LTTV. Mr. Wardle recommended that Minnick obtain a draft or
form easement agreement trom the LTTV, which he did in October
21

or November 2005. In February 2006, Minnick provided Hawley
Troxell an incomplete draft of a conservation easement with the
LTTV and sought the assistance of Hawley Troxell on all legal
issues relating to the conservation easement. From that point, if
not before, Defendant Wardle assumed primary responsibility on
behalf of Hawley Troxell for the production of a conservation
easement that would meet Plaintiffs' needs and satisfy all
applicable legal requirements. From February 22, 2006 through
September 7, 2006, Defendant Wardle and other Hawley Troxell
attorneys designated by the Defendants participated in numerous
reviews and revisions of the conservation easement leading to the
version presented to Minnick by Defendants for his signature.
Then, upon Defendants' instruction, the conservation easement
was recorded together with other related instruments on September
7, 2006. At no time prior to or following the recording of the
easement instrument did anyone associated with the Defendants
inform either Plaintiff of any problems with the legal sufficiency of
the conservation easement instrument or its recordation, as a
charitable deduction or otherwise.
(Id.) Similar allegations in the Complaint are also ignored in the District Court's decision. (See,

R. pp. 11-12, ~~ 26, 31 - 33)
The District Court also failed to consider or at least mention, the af1idavit of Tim Tarter,
explaining the scope of his representation and the evolution of various reasons for disallowance
advanced over time by the IRS. Mr. Tarter's affidavit deserves reading in full (See, R. pp. 33743), but certain undisputed statements should be given emphasis here. Mr. Tarter was initially
"engaged by Walter C. Minnick to assist and represent him and his wife relating to questions
then being raised by the IRS relating to a charitable deduction claimed on their 2006, 2007 and
2008 federal tax returns for a Conservation Easement."

(/d.

~

4. Emphasis added) Tarter

explains that the 30-day letter and the Examiner's Report which were the focus of his initial
services raised only the four issues we have discussed at length above, none of which implicated
malpractice. (/d.,

~

10) Prior to the June 10, 2010 facsimile from the IRS Appeals Officer, "no

question or potential concern had been raised about a subordination agreement and none of the
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communications from the IRS identified this as a reason for disallowance." (Id.,

~~

14 -15). On

September 19, 2011, "for the first time in the litigation the IRS claimed the subordination
requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A - 14(g)(2) had not been met" (Id.,
5.

~

19).

Not Until June 10, 2010, Did Appellants Incur Ascertainable and Recoverable

Damages for Malpractice.

On proper analysis of the facts and controlling standards from this Court, the question
presented by Respondents' statute of limitations defense can be stated succinctly. When can it
be said, with objectively ascertainable proof, that the Appellants incurred legal fees for the
services of their tax attorney which resulted from an occurrence, act or omission of malpractice
complained of and which Appellants could recover as damages from Respondents?
According to Respondents' argument below, that date is when the Minnicks first retained
Tim Tarter. The District Couli adopted this, concluding "the statute of limitations began as soon
as Plaintiffs retained new counsel to help them resolve the charitable deduction dispute with the
IRS." (R. p. 725) However, to affirm this holding, two questions must be answered:
First, had Appellants sued Respondents the day they retained Tarter to address the four
issues raised by the 30-day Letter and the IRS Examiner's Report, what would have been the
factual basis of a cognizable claim for malpractice against Respondents? Second, what attorney
fees incurred for Tatier's services would have been recoverable from Respondents, if failure to
subordinate had never been raised by the IRS and had not become the controlling issue before
the Tax Court?
Unless these questions can be answered to show "a complete and present cause of
action," as of when Tim Tatier was retained, the District Court's grant of summary judgment
must be reversed.

See, McCabe v. Cravens, supra.
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The Appellants' cause of action for

malpractice did not accrue prior to June 10, 2010, at the earliest. And, the filing of suit on June
7,2012 was within the limitation ofLC. § 5-219(4).
B.

Respondents Are Not Entitled to an Attorney Fee Award Pursuant to Idaho

Code, Section 12-120(3)
Following the decision granting summary judgment, Respondents sought costs and
attorney fees, which the District Court awarded them on December 30, 2013.

On appeal,

Appellants do not contest that Respondents were the prevailing party below, pursuant to Rules
54(d)(I)(B) and 54(e)(1), LR.C.P. They also do not contest the award of $66.00 in costs as a
matter of right, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(I)(E)(1), I.R.C.P., if the Respondents prevail on appeal.
However, Appellants do contest the District Court's award of attorney fees to Respondents
pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 12-120(3).
Even though Appellants seek reversal of the grant of summary judgment, on remand the
facts of this case warrant guidance from this Court on whether either party may be entitled to
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). The question of whether attorney fees are awardable to the
prevailing party on this appeal also requires this Court's attention.
1.

Applicable Legal Standards
Idaho Code, Section 12-120(3) authorizes an award of "a reasonable attorney's fee to be

set by the court" to the prevailing party "in any civil action to recover ... in any commercial
transaction." The term "commercial transaction" is defined in pertinent part to include "all
transactions except for personal ... purposes."
Historically, this Court has held "that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and
even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial
transaction,' attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authorized." Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho
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415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991) See also, Rice v. Lister, 13 2 Idaho 897, 901, 980 P .2d 561, 565 (1999).
In recent years, however, the categorical rule against awarding attorney fees under Section 12120(3) in t01i actions eroded with a series of cases. The standards which evolved from these
cases are of controlling significance in the instant action.
In Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368,109 P.3d 1104, 1111 (2005),
involving alleged bank fraud, it was held the "commercial transaction" provision of 12-120(3)
could support a fees award, under celiain circumstances.
The critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises
the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be
integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party
is attempting to recover. (Emphasis added)
Id., quoting Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 426,987 P.2d 1035, 1041
(1999). In Rahas v. Ver Mott, 141 Idaho 412, 415, III P.3d 97 (2005) this Court described the
legal standard as a two-part test, as follows:
In determining if attorney fees are appropriate in a commercial
transaction, this Court has adopted a two-part test. "First, the
commercial transaction must be integral to the claim, and second,
the commercial transaction must provide the actual basis for
recovery." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design
Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 493,65 P.3d 509, 515 (2003).

In Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007), alleging
fraud and breach of warranties, an identical standard was applied.
The decision in City of McCall v. Buxton, supra, 146 Idaho at 660, specifically overruled
Fuller v.. Wolters and other prior legal malpractice cases that denied fees under 12-120(3).11
More recently in another legal malpractice case, Soignier v. Fletcher. 151 Idaho 322, 326, 256
P.3d 730, 734 (2011), this Court explained that "in some instances, the prevailing party may be
II Because the Court in Buxton vacated the judgment and remanded the case, it did not offer any opinion on whether
attorney fees were ultimately awardable.
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entitled to attorney fees under § 12-120(3) in an action for malpractice so long as a commercial

transaction occurred between the prevailing party and the party from whom the party
seeks fees." (Emphasis added) But, in that case the Court held it was error for the district cOUli
to have awarded fees "because there was no commercial transaction between them (the parties)."
Id.

The necessity of a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit which forms
the basis of the claim has been emphasized in other non-legal malpractice cases, as well. See

Printercraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 460-61, 283 P.3d 757,
778-79 (2012) ("even if there are several commercial transactions that created the circumstances
underlying the claims, none of those transactions are between the parties.")
In deciding to award attorneys' fees in the instant action, the District Court placed
principal reliance upon Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 293 P.3d
645 (20l3). There, the plaintiff hired the defendant law firm to draft and enforce a real estate
purchase agreement. When the deal went awry, the law firm was sued for allegedly mishandling
the transaction, causing the plaintiff to lose his earnest money deposit.

154 Idaho at 23.

Reynolds does not rescind or modifY the standards enunciated in prior case law.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies where "a 'commercial transaction'
is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the
party is attempting to recover," and "[t]hus, as long as a
commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the
prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in
tort." (Citations omitted)
(Jd.) Nonetheless, the District Court's interpretation of the decision discards the statutory

requirement of a non-personal commercial transaction, see I.C. § 12-120(3), and the two-part test
applied consistently by this Court for years. Instead, the trial court erroneously substituted a
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fundamentally different test: "whether the legal representation was commercial in nature,"
irrespective of the absence of any commercial transaction which constitutes the basis of the
malpractice action. (R. p. 787)
2.

There Was No "Commercial Transaction" Satisfying the Requirements of Idaho

Code Section 12-120(3)
In order to satisfy the requirements of I.e. § 12-120(3), consistent with the language of
the statute and the standards of the case law, three things must be shown in this case. First, the
transaction constituting the basis of the malpractice claim must be "commercial," as opposed to
"transactions for personal . . . purposes."

I.e.

§ 12-120(3).

Second, there must be some

commercial transaction which "is integral to the (malpractice) claim, and constitutes the basis
upon which the party (Appellants) is attempting to recover." See, Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 26;
Soignier, 151 Idaho at 236; Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728; Rahas, 141 Idaho at 415; Lettunich, 141

Idaho at 368. Third, the commercial transaction must have "occurred between the prevailing
party (Respondents) and the party from whom the party seeks fees (Appellants)." Soignier v.
Fletcher, 151 Idaho at 326.

None of these three standards was satisfied in this case. To reach a conclusion awarding
attorney fees to Respondents, the District Court either ignored or evaded these standards.
a.

No "commercial transaction" constitutes the basis of the malpractice suit.

On Respondents' motion for attorney fees below, neither the Respondents nor the trial
comi could identify any particular transaction of a commercial nature which was integral to and
the basis of Appellants' malpractice claim. We defy Respondents to do so on this appeal. This
is not a suit like Reynolds, emanating from the drafting and enforcement of a real estate purchase
agreement. The legal services provided by Respondents were essentially of two kinds: assistance
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in obtaining approval of a land use development plat from Ada County and assistance in drafting,
executing and recording several easements, particularly a conservation easement from which
Appellants sought tax benefits.

In the litigation, the parties have vigorously disputed what

advice or assistance the Respondents provided or agreed to provide on the tax implications of the
conservation easement.

But, as was noted to the trial court in opposing Respondents' fees

request, the law firm's attorneys have repeatedly described their services as limited and narrowly
defined.
In the "Undisputed Facts" section of their memorandum in support of their summary
judgment motion, Respondents have represented that
Mr. Minnick contacted the Defendants from time to time with
discrete projects and specific tasks and requests. (citation omitted)
Mr. Minnick purposefully limited the scope of Defendants'
involvement in these discrete tasks and often complained about the
costs associated with their services. (citations omitted)
(R. p. 33) Even after one of the law firm's partners purportedly warned "he could not perform an
adequate review of the CC&R'S12 'on the cheap,'" the firm's attorney contends Mr. Minnick
continued to hire them only on "discrete projects and specific tasks and requests, consistently
limiting the scope of the attorneys (sic) work." (R. p. 34)
In opposing Appellants' partial summary judgment request, the principal lawyers who
attended to Appellants' legal needs filed affidavits, further delineating the non-transactional
scope of their legal services.

Attorney Ballard averred that HTEH assisted "with a host of

project specific tasks" (R. p. 654,

~

3), that Mr. Minnick would call "only when he needed and

wanted legal assistance on a particular topic" (R. p. 655,

~

7), that his "involvement dealt with

real estate matters ... such as roadway and CCR issues" (R. p. 654,

~

4) and that "Defendants'

primary focus was to ensure that the Showy Phlox subdivision satisfied all local land use, zoning
12

CC&Rs refers to Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions to the property being developed.
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and entitlement requirements."

(R. p. 655, ~ 6) Respondent Wardle was equally limiting

regarding his services. He described himself as "a real estate lawyer" (R. p. 650,

~

4). He

described the circumstance as "project-specific tasks" with Mr. Minnick "defining the scope of
work." (ld.,

~~

2 & 3) Being more specific, he testified,

The services I provided in relation to the Showy Phlox subdivision
related to ensuring the subdivision application satisfied the
applicable local land use, zoning, and entitlement requirements
defined by Ada County and the Ada County Highway District.
The Conservation Easement was just one aspect of the subdivision
entitlement process (ld. at, 4).
This activity no more constitutes a commercial transaction than if the law firm had been
negligent in obtaining a vendor license, zoning variance, roadway dedication or construction
permit for Appellants. No doubt Appellants hoped that the approval of the Showy Phlox Estates
would lead to the eventual sale of developed lots in the subdivision. But, there is a material
difference between the pursuit of governmental approval of land use conditions as a necessary
predicate to launching a hopeful enterprise, and actually participating in a commercial
transaction within the meaning ofI.C. § 12-120(3).
b.

The Conservation Easement from which the malpractice suit arises was a

personal gift unrelated to any commercial transaction.

The essence of Appellants' malpractice claim, as we have discussed at length, above, on
the statute of limitations issue, arises from Respondents' failure to ensure that a conservation
easement, reviewed and modified by Respondent Wardle, was subordinated to the U.S. Bank
loan on the Showy Phlox property. (See R. pp. 271-272) Specifically, this placed Appellants in
breach of the warranty in Paragraph 11 of the Conservation Easement l3 and fundamentally

13 The Conservation Easement prepared and recorded by Defendants provided in pertinent part "that there are no
outstanding mortgages ... that have not been expressly subordinated to the Easement." (R. p. 540 Exh. Y, ~ II)
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impaired their ability to obtain a charitable deduction under the applicable provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. I4
But, none of the legal serVices Respondents failed to provide on the Conservation
Easement is "fundamentally related" to a commercial transaction or even a commercial purpose.
I.C. § 12-120(3) expressly excludes transactions for personal purposes.

This Conservation

Easement was a gift from Appellant Walt Minnick personally to the Land Trust of the Treasure
Valley without consideration. IS

Its purpose was to secure a charitable tax deduction for the

Minnick and his wife personally. It is this charitable deduction which is at the center of this
lawsuit; nothing more. There are no facts which place this legal malpractice dispute within the
standards of Section 12-120(3).
c.

The District Court modified the "commercial transaction" test to reach an

erroneous result.
In reaching its decision to award attorney fees to the Respondents, the District Court
offered the following analysis.
When read together, Soignier and Reynolds indicate that in
determining whether there was a commercial transaction, the
Court should look to the transaction between the parties, as
opposed to any other transaction in which the Plaintiffs may
have been involved. Applying the analysis set for in Reynolds,
the Court finds that the Plaintiffs retained the Defendants for a
commercial purpose: to help them develop raw land into
residential lots for sale. While the Plaintiffs also wanted the
Defendants to help them obtain a sizeable personal tax deduction,
the Court finds that this task was part of the larger developmentrelated work.
The Court does not find that this case is distinguishable
from Reynolds on grounds that the Plaintiffs were not parties to a
transaction to sell the property. The dispositive issue in this case
See, 26 eFR Sec. 1.170A-14(g)(2).
The Showy Phlox property was owned by Walt Minnick, but both he and his wife benefited from any charitable
deduction on their joint income tax returns.
14
15
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is whether the legal representation was commercial in nature.
Reynolds indicates that legal representation is commercial in
nature if both parties entered into the relationship to realize a
commercial benefit. The Court finds that this test has been
satisfied here.
(R. p. 787) (Emphasis added) By this analysis, the District Court modified the "commercial
transaction" standard in several respects to reach an erroneous result.
In the first place, although the statutory language of Section 12-120(3) expressly requires
a commercial transaction, the District Court broadens the standard to include any legal
representation which may be characterized as "commercial in nature" or which has "a
commercial purpose," irrespective of how remote and regardless of any identifiable
"transacti on."
Second, by focusing on "the transaction between the parties"- essentially between client
and counsel

and expressly disregarding "any other transaction in which the Plaintiffs may be

involved," the District Court's analysis entirely eviscerates the two-part test atiiculated by the
case law. Since 2005, in all the cases discussed above, this court has repeatedly asked "whether
the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit." By way of explanation all
of these cases have identified the same two-part test; "the commercial transaction must be
integral to the claim and constitutes a basis on which the party is attempting to recover."
The sole basis on which Appellants have sued and sought recovery against Respondents
is a mishandled conservation easement; specifically, the failure to subordinate a mortgage to the
easement in breach of the warranty language of the Conservation Easement and, ultimately,
contrary to a federal tax regulation. This is the gravamen of Appellants' malpractice claim. By
modifying the legal standard, the District Court ignores this and effectively evades any inquiry
into (1) identifying a commercial transaction, (2) which is integral to Appellants' claim, and (3)
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which constitutes a basis of recovery. Such a standard deviates from the language of I.e. § 12120(3) and is in conflict with the established case law.
Ultimately, according to the District Court's opinion, the dispositive question is whether
"both parties (Appellants and Respondents) entered into the (legal) relationship to realize a
commercial benefit." (R. p. 787) "This test," according to the trial cOUli, "has been satisfied
here:' (Id.) Nowhere in the case law is this overly simplistic test articulated. Moreover, it begs
the question of what "commercial benefit" Appellants realized from Respondents' land use
planning, easement and tax advice.

There are no facts showing any tangible commercial

transaction or any commercial benefit resulting from the attorney

client relationship between

HTEI-I and the Minnicks.
C.

Attorney Fees on Appeal Under Section 12-120(3)

In so far as I.C. § 12-120(3) may provide for mandatory fees to a prevailing party at the
trial court, this same statute governs any award of fees sought on appeal. Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Paintball Sports, 999 P.2d, 134 Idaho 263 (2000). "When the appeal of an order on attorney fees
concerns entitlement to them, not the amount of an award, the statute does apply." Eighteen
Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 721,117 P.3d 130 (2005), citing Daisy Mfg.,
supra.
Below, the District Court noted that Appellants' Complaint alleges attorney fees under
Section 12-120(3), and characterized this pleading as suggesting that Appellants "believed that a
commercial transaction formed the basis of their claim for relief" (R. p. 787) This comment
seems a bit disingenuous given the debatable disagreement on whether there was a "commercial
transaction" and the case law holding that any fees award may be waived if not pled. See, City
(~fChubbuckv.

City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,203,899 P.2d 411 (1993), r'hg denied.
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If this Court vacates the summary judgment against Appellants and remands the action
for further proceedings, as sought by this appeal, entitlement to attorney fees under Section 12120(3) still demands attention. If it is the opinion of this Court that the character of the action
entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees under Section 12-120(3), then Appellants seek an
award of attorney fees on appeal. At the very least, with this Court's guidance, such fees should
be considered by the trial court following remand. See, Kulczyk v. Kehle, 108 Idaho 640, 643,
701 P.2d 260 (1985),

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons argued here, and such further reasons as may appear in subsequent
briefing and at oral argument, Appellants seek reversal of the District Court's grant of summary
judgment and remand of this case for consideration and ruling upon the remainder of Appellants'
motion for partial summary judgment and other proceedings consistent with this Court's
decision.
FUlihermore, irrespective of whether this Court reverses or affirms the grant of summary
judgment, Appellants seek rulings from this Court on whether any party (including Appellants) is
entitled to an award of attorney fees in this action, pursuant to

I.e. § 12-120(3), at the trial court

and/or on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this _ _day of April, 2014
MAUK MILLER & BURGOYNE

William L. Mauk, of the Firm
Attorneys for the Appellants
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Chronology of Events
Each of these events is documented in either the Complaint or in the Affidavits and Exhibits
referenced here, which were filed in support of Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. Most of the
Exhibits are attached to the Affidavit of Tim A. TaIier, Plaintiffs' counsel in the

u.s. Tax Court.

CR. pp. 337-343)
Feb.

Sept. 2006

Defendants engage in numerous modifications, drafts and
finalization of Conservation Easement CR. pp. 500, ~ 12;
580-583)

Sept. 7,2006

Conservation Easement signed by Minnick and recorded
by Respondents (R. pp. 534-543, Exh. Y)

Dec. 20, 2007

Minnicks file amended 2006 federal income tax return
claiming Conservation Easement as charitable deduction
(R. p. 12, ~ 35)

2007 & 2008

Minnicks claim carryover portions of the charitable
deduction on 2007 and 2008 federal income tax returns
CR. p. 13, ~~ 36-37)

June 20, 2008

IRS sends notice to Minnicks that their 2006 federal tax
return was selected for examination CR. pp. 344-346, Exh.
E)

June 1,2009

Minnicks engage tax attorney, Tim A. Tarter CR. p. 340, ~
14)

July 8, 2009

IRS issues Notice of Disallowance of the charitable
deduction C"30-Day Letter") for Minnicks' 2006 federal
tax return (R. pp. 347-349, Exh. F) together with Schedule
A Contributions Lead Sheet (R. pp. 350-358, Exh. F.l)

July 8, 2009

IRS issues Notice of Disallowance of the charitable
deduction ("30-Day Letter") for Minnicks' 2007 and 2008
federal tax return (R pp. 359-360, Exh. G) together with
Schedule A Contribution Carry Forward Lead Sheet (R.
pp. 361-373, Exh. G.1)

Sept. 17, 2009

IRS issues a Notice of Deficiency ("90-Day Letter") to
Minnicks for 2007 and 2008 federal tax returns (R. pp.
374-378, Exh. H)

Dec. 11,2009

Minnicks file Petition with U.S. Tax Court challenging
IRS Notice of Dcticiency dated 9/17/09 CR. pp. 379-381,
Exh. I)

Feb. 2,2010

IRS tiles Answer to Minnicks' U.S. Tax Court Petition CR.
pp. 382-384, Exh. J)

June 10,2010

IRS Appeals Officer submits questions to Minnicks' tax
attorney requesting "a copy of any and all subordination
agreements" (R. pp. 385-386, Exh. K)

January 2010

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley (HTEH) confirms to
Minnicks that no subordination agreement was prepared
and recorded. (R. p. 340, ~ 16)

Sept. 12, 2011

Subordination Agreement from U.S. Bank prepared and
recorded by HTEH

Sept. 19, 2011

IRS Pretrial Memorandum (R. pp. 387-415, Exh. L)

Oct. 4, 2011

IRS tiles Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Answer
in U.S. Tax Court (R. pp. 416-422; Exh. M)

Oct. 4,2011

U.S. Tax Court Trial (R. p. 340, ~ 18)

Dec. 9,2011

Minnicks file Response to IRS Motion for Leave to File
Amendment to Answer CR. pp. 423-434, Exh. N)

Jan. 5,2012

Order from U.S. Tax Court granting IRS leave to tile
amendment to their Answer (R. pp. 435-436, Exh. 0)

April 3,2012

U.S. Tax Court decision in Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138
T.C. No. 16 (2012) holding subordination must occur prior
to grant of conservation casement (R. pp. 437-463, Exh.
P)

April 17,2012

U.S. Tax Court suspends post-trial briefing schedule CR.
p. 464, Exh. Q)

July 18,2012

U.S. Tax Court limits post-trial briefing to (1) whether
petitioners'
conservation easement satisfies the
subordination requirements of the applicable Treasury
regulations, and (2) potential penalty assessments issues
(R. p. 465, Exh. R)

Dec. 17,2012

U.S. Tax Court Memorandum Findings of Fact and
Opinion holding Conservation Easement not deductible
because Minnicks "failed to meet the subordination
requirement." CR. pp. 466-486, Exh. S at 7)

Jan. 22,2013

Minnicks file Motion to Vacate Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration of Findings and Opinion in U.S. Tax
Court (R. pp. 487-503, Exh. T)

June 20, 2013

U.S. Tax Court Order denying Motion to Vacate and
Motion for Reconsideration (R. pp. 504-505, Exh. U)

